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Purpose: 
Despite growing research interest in cyber security, inter-firm based cyber risk studies are 
rare. Therefore, this study investigates cyber risk management in supply chain contexts. 
Methodology: 
Adapting a systematic literature review process, papers from interdisciplinary areas 
published between 1990 and 2017 were selected. Different typologies, developed for 
conducting descriptive and thematic analysis were established using data mining 
techniques to conduct a comprehensive, replicable and transparent review. 
Findings: 
The review identifies multiple future research directions for cyber security/resilience in 
supply chains. A conceptual model is developed, which indicates a strong link between IT, 
organisational and supply chain security systems. The human/behavioural elements within 
cyber security risk are found to be critical; however, behavioural risks have attracted less 
attention due to a perceived bias towards technical (data, application and network) risks. 
There is a need for raising risk awareness, standardised policies, collaborative strategies 
and empirical models for creating supply chain cyber-resilience. 
Research implications: 
Different type of cyber risks and their points of penetration, propagation levels, 
consequences and mitigation measures are identified. The conceptual model developed in 
this study drives an agenda for future research on supply chain cyber security/resilience.  
Practical implications: 
A multi-perspective, systematic study provides a holistic guide for practitioners in 
understanding cyber-physical systems. The cyber risk challenges and the mitigation 
strategies identified support supply chain managers in making informed decisions.  
Originality: This is the first systematic literature review on managing cyber risks in supply 
chains. The review defines supply chain cyber risk and develops a conceptual model for 
supply chain cyber security systems and an agenda for future studies. 
Keywords: Cyber risks, Cybersecurity, Cyber-attacks, Cyber resilience, Supply chain risk 
management, Supply chain resilience, Systematic literature review, Text mining 
1 Introduction 
Much work supports the view that the links of supply chains are increasingly global, and 
therefore, their integration is core to a successful supply chain (Mustafa Kamal and Irani, 
2014). The dependencies inherent in integration have led to work on the risks of 
connectedness in supply chains (Kache and Seuring, 2014; Garvey et al., 2015). Supply 
chains mandate a holistic approach to risk management (Ghadge et al., 2012); heightened 
levels of cooperation and integration create their own risks (Yoon et al., 2017). This study 
takes as its starting point the risks inherent in literally networking (supply chain) actors 
together through Information Technology (IT) infrastructures (Warren and Hutchinson, 
2000), as every node and connection between them poses a potential threat for the chain 
(The Institute of Risk Management, 2014). Supply chains that extensively utilise IT 
systems to satisfy customers’ requirements have been termed ‘cyber supply chains’ (CSC) 
(Boyson, 2014:346). The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), acts as a bridge 
between government and industry/society for advice, guidance and support on cyber 
security, including the management of cyber security threats within the UK. Similar 
National government cyber security organisations across the world attempt to protect their 
citizens and businesses from cyber threats and share vital information with their allies (e.g. 
EU, NATO) and other central bodies (e.g. Interpol) for global cyber security. The UK 
Office of Science and Technology produced a succinct definition of cyber security as
‘defences against electronic attacks launched via computer systems’ (Houses of 
Parliament, 2011). First, though, a cautionary note has to be raised concerning the 
additional complication that in such an emergent area, technology changes and dates. 
Descriptions such as ‘IT security event’, ‘cybercrime’ or ‘cyber-event’ all substantially 
refer to the concept of risk in the cyber context; yet, for example in their seminal paper, 
Faisal et al. (2007) refer to information risks as characterised by the presence of worms, 
viruses and Trojans.  
A traditional or physical supply chain (SC) is dominated by the movement of 
products, finance and information (Peck, 2006); whereas a cyber supply chain is a network 
of IT infrastructure and technologies that are used to connect, build and share data in virtual 
networks (Smith et al., 2007) enabling new forms of risk un-connected to physical products 
or even a distinct physical location (e.g. WannaCry ransomware). Supply chains are the 
backbone of evolving technological ecosystems, Industry 4.0 concepts such as the Internet 
of Things, Additive Manufacturing, Virtual Reality, Artificial Intelligence, Blockchain, 
both reflect, expand, alter and innovate the relationships between supply chain partners. 
However, developments in cyber security responses lag these advances in the digitalisation 
of supply chains. It has been argued that supply chains have unintentionally expanded their 
vulnerability by imprudently collaborating with many diverse partners (Boone, 2017). 
Smith et al. (2007) take the view that increasingly accessible IT systems have removed 
traditional, often bureaucratic, layers which used to function as protective barriers for 
organisations. In line with the growing capability of shared IT systems, modern cyber 
threats have also advanced dramatically, with increased consequences (Sokolov et al.,
2014). A recent example of the developing capability of cyber threats was observed in the 
food industry, where complacency led to the belief that IT-related risks would only affect 
office based work (Khursheed et al., 2016). However, more elaborate malware goes beyond 
the boundaries of offices and can infect automated production systems and the wider supply 
chain network. Cyber supply chains do not necessarily make business simpler and safer; 
they add complexity and can become more challenging to manage (Kunnathur, 2015). 
Intriguingly, a difference between cyber and conventional risk has been identified as the 
anonymity of cyber risk, as it can remain undetectable until it impacts businesses (Renaud 
et al., 2018).  
Organisations are increasingly becoming aware of cyber risks and their 
consequences and have increased cyber security response budgets (KPMG, 2017). 
Everyday media reports on cyber threats highlight the criticality of these risks for practice, 
yet the topic has attracted minimal academic attention in spite of its significant implication 
for the global supply chains (Davis, 2015; Eling and Wirfs, 2019). According to a global 
risk survey conducted by various consultancy and insurance firms (e.g. Gartner, AXA, 
Society of actuaries, Deloitte) in 2018, cyber security and data breaches emerged as the top 
enterprise risk. Extant literature has failed to address the implications of cyber threats at 
the level of supply chains (Smith et al., 2007; Urciuoli et al., 2013; Xue et al., 2013). To 
the best of research team’s knowledge, this study is the first to contribute a supply chain 
perspective on cyber risk/security/resilience in the form of a structured literature review 
(SLR). It is therefore crucial to identify, assess and mitigate cyber risks to reduce supply 
chain vulnerability. Following on from the above discussion, the study will address the 
following research question: How can organisations manage cyber risks in supply 
chains? Through addressing this question, this study will identify, classify, assess and 
mitigate cyber risks in supply chains.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the adopted 
research design and the use of a data mining approach for developing multiple typologies. 
Sections 3 and 4 discuss the findings from the descriptive and thematic analysis. Lastly, 
section 5 discusses key findings, the conceptual model and critical directions for further 
research along with implications for research and practice. 
2 Research Design 
A systematic literature review (SLR) is the universally preferred approach for executing an 
objective and extensive investigation of literature relevant to a specific research topic. The 
SLR follows a structured procedure that is scientific, replicable and transparent (Tranfield
et al., 2003). Traditional literature reviews can be criticised for bias, as they steer the reader 
toward a specific direction based on the researchers’ perception  (Wilding and Wagner, 
2012). In contrast to avoid claims of bias, this study presents a ‘concept-centric’ approach 
(Webster and Watson, 2002) for conducting an SLR by adapting key elements from 
Tranfield et al. (2003), Rousseau et al. (2008) and Denyer and Tranfield (2009). The 
specific SLR process adopted here is divided into three stages, with each stage containing 
the set of activities shown in Figure 1.  
2.1 Systematic literature review  
2.1.1 Identification of data sources 
This exploratory stage of identifying data sources maps a wide range of literature and helps 
in building an understanding of critical concepts and developing ‘search strings’ (Ehrich
et al., 2002; Arksey and O'Malley, 2005). The initial step is to identify key search terms 
derived from the research question. Since the study examines how an organisation can 
manage cyber risks in supply chains, i.e. the risk associated with combining supply chains 
and information technology, the choice of keywords was judiciously selected to include 
two connected fields namely supply chain risk management (SCRM) and information 
technology (IT). Boolean search was used since the search domain comprised of many 
interfaces. Different search string combinations were identified based on an initial 
understanding of the existing literature on cyber risk in supply chains. Appendix I provides 
an exhaustive list of the keywords selected by the research team. Following a mind 
mapping session, the most important search string combinations were finalised. Keywords 
such as ‘cyber’, ‘data’, ‘information’ and ‘technology’ were combined with risk, 
disruption, security, attack, along with other related words frequently used in the 
SCRM/Risk management literature.  
Figure 1. Systematic literature review process  
(Adapted from Tranfield et al., 2003; Rousseau et al., 2008; Denyer and Tranfield, 2009) 
IDENTIFICATION OF DATA SOURCES
 Identification of search strings
 Identification of data sources
 Setting inclusion and exclusion criteria
DATA SCREENING AND SYNTHESIS
 Screening of selected data
 Text mining for theme development
 Data extraction and synthesis
DATA ANALYSIS AND DESSEMINATION
 Descriptive and thematic analysis
 Dissemination of findings
 Framework development and future research
Figure 2 shows the search string combinations used for the identification of data 
sources. To obtain a wide range of literature, two electronic databases- Scopus and 
ProQuest were searched using the search strings identified. Although broader selection 
criteria are recommended for an SLR, it is critical to define the boundaries and scope of 
the research. Including articles published in peer-reviewed journals positively influences 
the quality of the study (Burgess et al., 2006); hence, books, conference papers, editorials, 
HTML-links as well as both ‘grey literature' and ‘white literature' were excluded (Ghadge 
et al. 2019). Furthermore, only academic articles published in the last twenty years (1997-
2017) were considered in order to capture more recent developments in the area. 
Figure 2. Search String combinations used for identification of data sources 
2.1.2 Data screening and synthesis 
Another essential stage of framing the SLR is to assess the quality of the papers identified. 
While there is no consensus across academic fields on one quality appraisal method for 
SLRs, in management studies, researchers frequently rely on the journal quality-rankings 
to determine article inclusion (Tranfield et al., 2003). The decision was taken that due to 
the comparative sparsity of extant literature in this area, instead of a particular journal 
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quality ranking guide (i.e. CABS, ABDC), article quality appraisal would be based on the 
judgment of the research team, with additional quality validation by an external third-party 
expert. 
The initial search run on ProQuest produced 2,856 hits in the literature, while 6,637 
potential papers were found via Scopus. Making use of these databases’ built-in functions, 
inclusion and exclusion criteria (explained earlier) were applied to the articles leaving a 
total of 3,890 peer-reviewed papers, 2,149 from ProQuest and 1,741 from Scopus. After 
the removal of duplicates, a total of 1,434 papers meeting the selection criteria were taken 
into consideration. 
The next necessary step was to identify papers closely related to cyber security/risk 
in supply chains. This was done by manually screening the titles and abstracts; two groups 
(from the research team) independently selected papers and compiled them together to 
identify common papers. Following this iterative step, further 1373 papers were excluded. 
Full-text reading of the 61 remaining papers led to further exclusion of 22 papers. Finally 
following a rigorous screening process to achieve a high-quality output, 39 papers were 
considered relevant. Besides, bibliography screening of the selected papers identified a 
further 3 related articles; giving a total of 41 articles to inform the analysis and were agreed 
with the external third-party expert. 
2.1.3 Data analysis and dissemination 
The data analysis stage aims to break the vast amounts of accumulated data into smaller, 
coherent parts and examine the extent to which they relate to each other (Denyer and 
Tranfield, 2009). QDA Miner©, a qualitative data analysis software developed by Provalis 
Research, was used as a text mining platform. Text mining was applied to cross-validate 
the search strings manually derived from the data identification process and to provide 
further support for the data analysis. Text mining identified the most important words or 
phrases by frequency (Figure 3); the manually selected key strings strongly match with 
those identified through the text mining. This cross-validation of the choice of search 
strings helps to limit research team bias and validate the reliability of the SLR process. 
Connectivity-based clustering or hierarchical clustering is an algorithm based on the core 
idea of filtering objects that are more related to nearby objects (than to objects farther 
Figure 3: Key terms and phrases identified following data mining 
Figure 4. Exploded view of cluster diagram for cyber risk in supply chains (specimen) 
Table I. Descriptive analysis 
Reference  Research Methodology Research Design 
Author et al. (year) Quant. Quali. Mixed  Review Survey/ 
interview 
Experiment 
/model 
Case 
study 
Concept. 
Al Kattan et al. (2009) ✓ ✓ ✓
Bahl and Wali (2014) ✓ ✓
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010) ✓
Barlow and Li (2007) ✓ ✓ ✓
Bartol (2014) ✓ ✓
Boone (2017) ✓ ✓
Boyes (2015) ✓ ✓
Boyson (2014) ✓ ✓
Cai and Jun (2008) ✓ ✓
Charitoudi et al. (2014) ✓ ✓ ✓
Davis (2015) ✓ ✓
Deane et al. (2009) ✓ ✓
Durowoju (2012) ✓ ✓
Faisal et al. (2007) ✓ ✓
Hamlen et al. (2013) ✓ ✓
Huang et al. (2008) ✓ ✓
Jones and Horowitz (2012) ✓
Keegan (2014) ✓ ✓
Khursheed et al. (2016) ✓ ✓
Kim and Im (2014) ✓ ✓
Linton et al. (2014) ✓ ✓
Manzouri et al. (2013) ✓ ✓
Pfleeger et al. (2007)  ✓ ✓
Rongping and Yonggang (2014) ✓ ✓
Sharma and Routroy (2016) ✓ ✓ ✓
Sindhuja (2015) ✓ ✓
Kunnathur (2014) ✓ ✓ ✓
Sokolov et al. (2014) ✓ ✓
Stephens and Valverde (2013) ✓ ✓
Tran et al. (2016) ✓ ✓ ✓
Urciuoli (2015) ✓ ✓
Urciuoli and Hintsa (2017) ✓ ✓
Urciuoli et al. (2013) ✓ ✓
Venter (2014) ✓ ✓
Warren and Hutchinson (2000) ✓ ✓
Williams (2014) ✓ ✓
Windelberg (2013) ✓
Xue et al. (2013) ✓
Zhang et al. (2012) ✓
Smith et al. (2006) ✓
Linkov (2013) ✓
Table II. Definitions from the literature: Cyber supply chain 
Perspective Definitions  Reference 
Supply Chain 
"E-supply chains involve organisations using online information, to perform, rather than just support, 
some value-adding activities in the supply chain more efficiently and effectively." 
(Barlow and Li, 2007, p. 289) 
"[Cyber supply chain is] the entire set of key actors and their organisational and process-level 
interactions that plan, build, manage, maintain, and defend the IT system infrastructure.” 
(Boyson et al., 2010, p. 200) 
“IT system supply chain is a globally distributed and dynamic collection of people, process, 
and technology.”  
(Simpson, 2010, p. 3) 
“A cyber supply chain is a supply chain enhanced by cyber-based technologies to establish an effective 
value chain.” 
(Kim and Im, 2014, p. 387) 
“The probability of loss arising because of incorrect, incomplete, or illegal access to information.”  (Faisal et al., 2007, p. 679) 
Supply Chain Risk 
"[…] degradation or disruption to a supply chain's infrastructure or structural resources resulting 
from the successful exploitation of IT vulnerabilities by threats within an organisation, within the 
supply chain network, or in the external environment." 
(Smith et al., 2007) 
"IT security incidents occur when a threat directed against an organisational asset causes a 
compromise in one (or more) of three areas: confidentiality, integrity or availability (CIA)." 
(Deane et al., 2009, p. 5) 
Operational risks to information and technology assets that have consequences affecting the 
confidentiality, availability or integrity of information systems." 
“Cybercrime can be defined as any crime that is facilitated or committed using a computer, network, 
or hardware device; in particular, the computer or the device may be the agent, facilitator, or target of 
the crime that takes place in virtual or non-virtual places.” 
(Cebula and Young, 2010)  
(Urciuoli et al., 2013, p. 51) 
"A cyber-event is  any disturbance to this interdependent network that leads to loss of functionality, 
connectivity, performance, or capacity." 
(Boyes, 2015, p. 29) 
Supply Chain Risk 
Management 
"CSCRM (cyber supply chain risk management) can be defined as the organisational strategy and 
programmatic activities to assess and mitigate risks across the end-to-end processes (including design, 
development, production, integration, and deployment) that constitute the supply chains for IT 
networks, hardware, and software systems." 
(Boyson, 2014, p. 342) 
“[…] the application of policies, procedures, and controls (technical, formal, informal 
and management) to protect supply chain information assets (product, facilities, 
equipment, information, and personnel) from theft, loss, damage, interceptions or unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, interruptions or disruption, modification or fabrication.”
(Sindhuja and Kunnathur, 2015, 
p. 483) 
away), to build a hierarchical network (Tan et al., 2017). Cluster analysis was conducted 
to identify a group of entities based on their similarities and differences in the subject area. 
An exploded view of the identified clusters is provided as an example in Figure 4. It can 
be observed that sub-areas having a close affinity to each other come together (circled in 
Figure 4 for clarity) following a hierarchical clustering approach. After studying all the 
clusters for patterns and dendrograms for the taxonomic relationships (example shown in 
Figure 5), different themes were identified for the data analysis. Furthermore, sub-
categories for themes emerged during the iterative process of data screening, and synthesis 
and these were utilised for developing a ‘theme-based' typology. A comprehensive list of 
meta themes and associated sub-categories identified are shown in Figure 6.  
Figure 5. Dendrogram used for developing typologies (specimen) 
The two-fold reporting approach recommended by Tranfield et al. (2003) is adopted 
in this paper. Descriptive analysis will report an overview of the field of study. 
Furthermore, a thematic analysis will report the findings in detail and help in drawing 
conclusions and future research avenues.  
Figure 6. Typologies: ‘theme-based’ framework for analysis 
3. Descriptive analysis 
Table I presents an overview of the SLR content in terms of the research methodology and 
different types of research design adopted for data collection and analysis. 
3.1 Definitions 
In the evolving definition of what constitutes a cyber supply chain (Table II), we see 
broadening of scope over time, from the earliest definition linking online activities 
undertaken by firms or chain (Barlow and Li, 2007; Sindhuja and Kunnathur, 2015). What 
is notable is the consistent use of terms relating to the value creation. Kim and Im (2014) 
believe that cyber supply is ‘an effective value chain’. In terms of supply chain risk, the 
same broadening of the scope is seen over time, but early work is heavily focused on 
technology and exogenous threats. Later definitions include awareness of endogenous 
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threats “...theft, loss, damage, interceptions or unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
interruptions or disruption, modification or fabrication” (ibid.). In Table II, we see 
cohesion on definitions of SCRM as it being the application of various tools and a guiding 
process for endogenous and exogenous risks. Therefore, the study takes forward from these 
definitions that supply chain cyber security systems are an integrated alignment of 
processes involving infrastructure network, IT system and organization. 
3.2 Research distribution  
The work by Warren and Hutchinson (2000) can be seen as a milestone for the field and a 
key paper for this study; they report a survey that found approximately 60% of IT managers 
had no awareness of, or policy on cyber security. Ironically, attacks in 2005 and 2006 on 
Homeland Security, the department tasked with keeping the USA secure, seem to have 
piqued academic interest in the latter half of this period. Looking at the trend in the 
publications between 1997 and 2017, the first article that relates to cyber supply chains was 
only published in 2000; since then, academic research on cyber security has grown, 
particularly in the IT and computer engineering fields. 
3.3 Geographic distribution 
Approximately half of the selected papers originate from researchers based in either the 
USA or UK (Figure 7); Government institutions from both countries have raised the profile 
of cyber security through different initiatives aimed at promoting its importance among 
both practitioners and academics (see Luiijf et al., 2013). Keegan (2014) and Rongping and 
Yonggang (2014) claim that inducements and support from governmental bodies will be 
crucial for the progression of research in this field. Surprisingly, while countries like the 
USA or UK developed their first national cyber security strategies long before 2010, 
European countries such as Germany, France or the Czech Republic did not present theirs 
until 2011. India has emerged as one of the leading low-cost destinations for outsourcing 
IT operations (Bahl et al., 2011); Luiijf et al. (2013) supports the strength and economic 
ambition of India with regard to ICT systems and argue that Indian firms see cyber security 
as an opportunity for further economic growth.    
Figure 7. Geographic distribution of research 
3.4 Methodological distribution 
The research methodologies can be separated into qualitative, quantitative and mixed 
approaches. Most of the research methods in this field are qualitative, whereas only a 
limited number of quantitative research designs have been identified. These findings 
support the initial claims made about the progression stage of the literature on the topic and 
are consistent with Creswell (2014) positing that prevalence of qualitative works in an 
academic field is an indicator of the immaturity of the field and the lack of consensus on 
key concepts. Maturity and relatively stable constructs are associated with more 
quantitative research designs (ibid.); by implication, research on the topic of cyber security 
in SCs is still at a nascent stage. In part this unequal split reflects the multidisciplinary 
nature of the research topic. Research in IT-related fields is usually dominated by 
quantitative approaches, while qualitative modes are more prominent in the area of SCM 
(Ho et al., 2015). Qualitative and quantitative methodologies are not substitutes for each 
other as they approach different aspects of the same reality (McCracken, 1988), but are 
simultaneously necessary to understand complexities in the research thoroughly. Only 12% 
of the sample for this SLR is purely quantitative; Charitoudi and Blyth (2014) propose that 
the lack of accessible quantitative cyber data critically limits researchers’ ability to model 
supply chain cyber risks. 
4 Thematic analysis 
The thematic analysis combines the careful reading of the selected papers, as a part of the 
data screening and synthesis stage with categories confirmed following the text mining 
approach. 
4.1 Type of cyber risks 
Extant literature has a variety of theoretical frameworks for the classification of different 
supply chain risks (e.g., Jüttner et al., 2003; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Ho et al., 2015). In 
an attempt to make sense of these new and unexplored risks, Gordon and Ford (2006) and 
Urciuoli et al. (2013) posit Type I and Type II cyber risks. Type I cyber risks include 
incidents of phishing and theft or manipulation of data or services, Type II covers 
cyberstalking and harassment, stock market manipulation or blackmailing and corporate 
espionage. However, this classification of cyber risks only focusses on deliberate acts 
carried out by malicious actors. Other classifications of cyber risks, such as those provided 
by Smith et al. (2007) or Tran et al. (2016), either miss out on principal (focal firm) risks 
or become very engaged with other, mostly technical risks. Simialry, NCSC, UK (2016) 
classify cyber attacks into un-targetted and targetted attacks. Phishing, ransomware and 
scanning are covered under un-targeted attacks, as they target multiple devices or users. 
Spear-phishing, denial of service and subverting supply chains are captured under targetted 
attacks. This classification does not consider attacks arising from physical breakdown and 
internal activities. Based on the data synthesis of selected papers, a holistic classification 
of cyber risks is developed as shown in Figure 8. Each of the identified ‘cyber risks’ are 
explained below. 
Figure 8. Classification of cyber risks 
4.1.1 Physical threats 
The physical dimension includes tangibles such as switches, servers, routers and other ICT 
devices. According to Boyes (2015), the presence of physical and environmental risks 
seems to be ignored by many risk managers, when talking about cyber risks. In this study, 
a few articles (e.g. Faisal et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2007; Charitoudi and Blyth, 2014; Tran 
et al., 2016; Urciuoli and Hintsa, 2017) acknowledge natural disasters as a critical driver 
for cyber risks. For example, when a flood or a tornado disrupts the functioning of servers, 
which then interferes with the seamless flow of the cyber supply chain network. 
Meanwhile, Smith et al. (2007) and Urciuoli and Hintsa (2017) go one step further and add 
the deliberate damaging or theft of physical infrastructure components to this physical risk 
category. Faisal et al. (2007) also consider terrorist attacks to be a part of the physical 
aspect of cyber risks. Risks that affect the functioning and security of a supply chain’s 
physical assets are, paradoxically, cyber risks. 
4.1.2 Breakdown 
The, perhaps, humdrum risk of systems or resources breaking down through causes such 
as outdated firewalls and overdue security updates have only attracted attention in two 
articles (Boyes, 2015; Tran et al., 2016). While the least exotic cyber risk (e.g., website 
failure due to a peak in data traffic), cannot be ignored, such failures are easier to predict 
than natural disasters or intentional attacks; however, their potential consequences can be 
equally severe. 
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4.1.3 Indirect and direct attacks 
The cyber risk of deliberate assaults falls into two categories - direct attacks and indirect 
attacks. The first category comprises acts such as hacking attacks (Deane et al., 2009; 
Khursheed et al., 2016; Sharma and Routroy, 2016; Boone, 2017), denial-of-service (Faisal 
et al., 2007; Deane et al., 2010) or password sniffing (Warren and Hutchinson, 2000) for 
financial gains. Several authors, for example, Faisal et al. (2007) and Tran et al. (2016), 
include the risks of industrial espionage or compromises to intellectual property, under 
direct attack.
In the Indirect attacks the attackers lay out ‘bait’ which enables them to access the 
target system. Commonly discussed methods in the literature include viruses, worms and 
Trojans (Warren and Hutchinson, 2000; Faisal et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2007; Jones and 
Horowitz, 2012), counterfeit products, soft- and hardware (Urciuoli et al., 2013; Linton et 
al., 2014; Williams, 2014; Boyes, 2015), malicious codes (Smith et al., 2007; Deane et al., 
2010; Kunnathur, 2015) and spoofing attacks (Warren and Hutchinson, 2000; Smith et al., 
2007). If employees accept the bait by, for example, visiting a website or downloading 
software, the attacker gains access to the system. Cyber-attacks that originate via phishing, 
i.e. gaining access to sensitive information by disguising the threat as a trustworthy entity, 
are on the rise (Verizon, 2018), and heightened cyber awareness is necessary to tackle such 
disguised attacks. 
4.1.4 Insider threat 
According to Kunnathur (2015), employees often represent the most significant risk to a 
company’s cyber security. Internally, employees were found to be careless with password 
confidentiality (Stephens and Valverde, 2013), including writing passwords down for easy 
recall (Venter, 2014). Furthermore, absent-mindedly disclosing sensitive information while 
discussing with colleagues or others is identified as a risk that companies need to be aware 
of (Kunnathur, 2015). In connection with these acts of thoughtlessness, the literature also 
reports incidents in which employees consciously misuse or even sabotage a company’s 
information. For example, opportunistic misuse of confidential data (Deane et al., 2009) or 
a premeditated personal vendetta against an employer (Sharma and Routroy, 2016). As the 
employee cyber threat is internal, whether deliberate or accidental, this is termed an insider 
threat.
 Reporting on deliberately executed, maliciously motivated cyber-attacks (Urciuoli, 2010) 
should not be allowed to crowd out cyber supply risks resulting from merely careless 
employees (Urciuoli et al., 2013; Urciuoli et al., 2017). In both the negligent and 
premeditated mode, the human factor can pose the biggest and most unpredictable threat 
to a company's cyber security. Employees could act as insiders and support criminals in 
perpetuating their actions, or they could perpetrate a crime on their own, as they may have 
easy access to facilities or cargo (Urciuoli, 2010). 
4.2 Points of penetration 
To allocate security resources, organisations need to know the weak points of the supply 
chain network where these risks are most likely to penetrate (Smith et al., 2007); referred 
to as ‘points of penetration’ (PoP). Urciuoli et al. (2013) reported that 50% of malicious 
cyber-attacks target smaller organisations due to the lack of adequate protection measures 
installed in their information systems. SMEs might have a lower security capability, but 
their attack surface and visibility are also dramatically smaller (Caldwell, 2015). Data 
synthesis identifies three key ‘failure points’ where cyber risks emerge. PoPs are classified 
into technical, human and physical dimensions. 
4.2.1 Technical PoPs
Smith et al. (2007) define the weakest link of a SC quite broadly by claiming all IT-related 
assets are prone to cyber risks including systems, software, personnel and equipment. ICT 
systems and related resources may improve performance while also increasing technology 
risk (Xue et al., 2013). In particular, legacy (inherited) or outdated and poorly maintained 
systems attract wilful attacks. Outsourcing servers to save up-front capital costs reduces 
overall direct costs (Boyson, 2014), but the loss of control over security may increase long-
term indirect costs dramatically. 
4.2.2 Human PoPs 
Most companies, as claimed by Sindhuja (2014), complacently assume that cyber security 
is only about technical security. In reality, technical cyber security solutions will have been 
grounded in security analysis; the same is often not the case with human involvement, 
individuals, who theoretically should be the first layer of protection. Boone (2017) argues 
that companies are only as secure as the most susceptible stakeholder in their supply 
networks. Urciuoli and Hintsa (2017) suggest that human resources could either willingly 
choose to harm their own company, or pose a threat by accident or be forced to collaborate 
with criminals by means of viruses, blackmailing, etc. Kim and Im (2014) found that 
internal human errors are likely to have severe consequences, but also more challenging to 
identify than external events. Kunnathur (2015) builds on the importance of human PoPs, 
arguing that potential cyber aggressors are well aware of this vulnerability. Consequently, 
they suggest (ibid.) that future cyber risks, and especially intended attacks, are expected to 
exploit human PoPs rather than, hitherto, focus on the technical domain. This vulnerability 
is then intensified when SC employees interact with each other across organisational 
boundaries. Ill-secured inter-organisational supply chain connections between companies 
are a PoP for cyber risks, which may work as facilitators for the propagation of these risks.
4.2.3 Physical PoPs 
Charitoudi and Blyth (2014) state that physical objects such as buildings, machines and 
other surroundings can also represent a PoP for cyber risks. In a recent study on cyber 
security in the food industry, Khursheed et al. (2016) report incidents in which obsolete 
firewalls and inadequate control mechanisms allowed attackers to gain remote access to 
production lines. In addition, physical infrastructures are always vulnerable to tangible 
risks such as natural disaster or physical attacks that impact cyber systems. However, as 
such disasters are naturally rare and unavoidable (Smith et al., 2007), companies like to 
perceive them as less of a concern for cyber safety (Sharma and Routroy, 2016).  
4.3. Propagation zones 
The consequences of cyber risks can be short to long term. While damage to servers will 
have noticeable effects immediately following their occurrence, others, for example, 
information leakage, can take years to recognise (Boone, 2017) or will never be disclosed. 
Data theft is central to cybercrime (Urciuoli and Hintsa, 2017) which, to date, seems to 
have exempted communities from direct cyber-attack. The risk propagation model 
proposed here, suggests supply chain risks are not static and, propagate out from the centre 
of risk occurrence to other related areas with the ‘cascading or ripple effect’ (Ghadge et 
al., 2013; Dolgui et al., 2018). Therefore, it is likely that cyber risks will typically follow 
similar risk propagation patterns, as shown in Figure 9.  
Figure 9. Propagation zones of cyber risk  
4.3.1 Primary propagation 
As indicated by the PoP discussion, regardless of where a risk finds its way into a system, 
there is always a disruption to the company's operations. Risk propagation compromises 
the operation’s continuity (Warren and Hutchinson, 2000; Boyson, 2014), productivity 
(Manzouri et al., 2013) and quality (Jones and Horowitz, 2012). Cyber-attacks in Germany 
(Boyes, 2015) and Iran (Jones and Horowitz, 2012), report that blast furnaces and 
centrifuges, respectively, were damaged, threatening not just individual operations but the 
entire factory/output. A lone report on the consequences for employees (Manzouri et al., 
2013) claims aggressor breaches of security systems discourage employees, particularly 
their willingness to continue working under such circumstances (echoing Reade’s (2009) 
non cyber finding in terror act environments). Except for the above, there appears to be 
limited discussion on primary consequences from cyber-attacks, and there is a lack of 
studies focussing on the consequences for employees and organisational sustainability of 
such attacks, whether successful or not. This theme has exposed a strong tendency to a 
binary approach based on the success or failure of an attack/cyber risk episode; thus, more 
studies are needed on the impacts and how processes and people respond to the cyber-
attacks.  
4.3.2 Secondary propagation 
Supply chain relationships facilitate information sharing, including detrimental 
information like cyber breaches. Several authors claim that reputational damage resulting 
from a cyber-attack discourages further collaboration with existing and prospective SC 
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partners (Urciuoli et al., 2013; Charitoudi and Blyth, 2014). Post-supply-chain cyber-
attack, authors highlight the potential unavailability of information, services or products 
for further use (e.g., Warren and Hutchinson, 2000; Charitoudi and Blyth, 2014). Inter-
connected systems and machinery will be affected, leading to unsatisfied customer 
requirements and loss of sales and profit. Losses will include near-time opportunity costs, 
but also potential longer-term reputational damage. Breaches of confidential information 
(such as supplier databases, contracts and payment details) could have major implications 
for the supply chain network. In spite of increased security in data storage platforms, data 
breaches are a regular occurrence; thus, there is a need for robust cyber security measures 
to protect cyber-physical systems. 
4.3.3 Tertiary propagation 
A study in the automotive industry found that hostile malware can corrupt the braking 
system of a car in a way that could not be detected by the manufacturer (Jones and 
Horowitz, 2012). Thus, individuals in the wider society face the initial brunt of this supply 
chain cyber-attack. According to Urciuoli and Hintsa (2013), the consequences of SC 
cyber-attacks for a community or society could be more serious, if criminals attack supply 
chains relevant to public health, e.g., food or pharmaceutical chains. 
There is also a dynamic behaviour to cyber-attack consequences; as defences 
improve, the attacks move elsewhere. In two articles, Urciuoli and Hintsa (2013; 2017) 
explain that criminals can for now steal valuable cyber data – such as loading lists and 
transportation schedules - to plan and execute traditional non-cyber [theft] crimes; with 
relative impunity. It is evident that cyber risks directly impact organisations profit margins, 
market capitalisation and brand image (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2013), along with indirectly 
impacting wider businesses and society.  
4.4 Challenges for cyber security 
4.4.1 Inter-organizational collaboration 
In traditional supply chains, two parties might share some information and very 
occasionally, the same IT platform. The risk is amplified when cyber supply chains and 
order management systems link multiple supply parties together or share the data in 
outsourced (e.g. Cloud) platforms. A lack of accepted standards and guidelines is hindering 
the development of robust cyber defences (Boyson, 2014; Davis, 2015). Authors argue that 
supply chain partners must be more transparent with each other on security and should 
combine security resources and know-how to deal with increasingly sophisticated cyber 
risks (Rongping and Yonggang, 2014). The propagation of cyber consequences means 
companies cannot afford to focus only on their security systems and must also be aware of 
their partner's security conditions (Deane et al., 2010). Supply chain collaboration based 
on open, honest and trust-based relationships is needed to effectively deal with supply chain 
cyber-related risks (Tran et al. 2016). Smith et al. (2007) recommend that SC integration, 
by aligning systems and processes, will yield better returns through standardised ways of 
working, shared security objectives and better general communication (see conceptual 
model, Figure 10). Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010) argue that higher levels of integration and 
collaboration reduce free-riding behaviour when considering investment in cyber security.  
4.4.2 Employee knowledge 
One of the stand-out findings from this SLR is the important role played by employees as 
the front-line of cyber security in SCs. Although the most visible layer of security to 
outsiders, it is challenging to hire cyber–security-trained and skilled resources given the 
complex, emergent and technological demands of SC security (Xue et al., 2013; Venter, 
2014; Khursheed et al., 2016). So far, cyber threats have outpaced training and study 
initiatives. Ideally, such staff members are proactive employees in contact with cyber 
applications who need to know not only how to operate the systems, but also how to react 
in cases of attack. Khursheed et al. (2016) describe the ideal situation in which highly 
skilled employees are not only cyber risk reactive, but also have the skill-set to pre-empt 
cyber PoP risks. 
4.4.3 Continuous commitment 
The eco-systems in which cyber SCs operate are constantly evolving (Kim and Im, 2014); 
compounded by different geopolitical situations, regulatory frameworks as well as 
corporate and national cultures that merge in one supply chain. Cyber risk management is 
not only about protecting data, but also maintaining the privacy, trust and safety of 
stakeholders involved in the business network. Hackers and other potential invaders, on 
the other hand, have no such encumbrances and with the advantage of agility can invest in 
being ahead of the curve thriving on awareness of cyber trends and new technologies 
(Boyes, 2015), in order to create novel and ever more sophisticated and unpredictable 
cyber-crimes. 
These two issues of timeframe and level of focus are built upon based on a theme 
found in the cyber supply chain literature, the disconnection between standard business 
practices and the requirement for a continuous commitment to cyber security. According 
to Linkov et al. (2013), many of the risks that have struck companies only manifest after 
months or even years; however, these manifestations exceed the attention (and job) span 
of most managers who are driven by short and medium-dated performance objectives 
(Urciuoli and Hintsa, 2017). Boone (2017) goes beyond timing and performance to argue 
that it is not merely a commitment to cyber security issues which is missing, but also 
responsibility and ownership. The introduction and maintenance of appropriate cyber 
security systems cannot be a one-person show; they require the contribution and 
commitment, over time, of many departments and much expertise. 
4.4.4 Governmental involvement 
Traditionally, governments have focused their interest on the security of military and 
national intelligence agencies (Keegan, 2014); however, they now have to include the 
security of supply chains that are significant contributors to their economies. More than 50 
countries have issued national cyber security strategies with defined objectives (Rongping 
and Yonggang, 2014). The European Union regularly updates its EU Cybersecurity 
Strategy. The growing complexity of cyber SCs makes it impossible for individual 
companies acting alone to promote and coordinate holistic security efforts. Hence, Keegan 
(2014) claims governments have to sponsor and guide cyber security projects and create 
forums which allow for more accessible communication and planning of strategies to 
manage cyber risks.   
4.5 Measures for mitigation 
This section has identified measures to mitigate cyber risks from the extant literature. The 
risk mitigation typically depends on the type of cyber-attack, sophistication of the attack 
and resilience of the organisation (Amin et al., 2017). While some of the proposed 
countermeasures may look familiar from the traditional SCRM studies (e.g., supplier audits 
and information sharing), others focus on cyberspace more explicitly and are, therefore, 
new to the literature. Building on the scope of cyber risks identified here, the study rejects 
using a conventional proactive and reactive risk mitigation classification and instead 
proposes a time phases classification of cyber-attack mitigation measures.  
In their efforts to model a system-aware cyber security architecture, Jones and 
Horowitz (2012) differentiate between three phases of a cyber-attack, namely pre-, trans- 
and post-attack. This time phase structure is adopted in this study to use a wider analytical 
lens on the stages of, and countermeasures for a cyber-attack. Table III classifies cyber risk 
measures for mitigation following pre, trans and post cyber-attack stages. Pre-attack 
countermeasures can be divided between those aimed at the technical level and those which 
are either directed at or carried out by human factors. Firstly, technical countermeasures 
include aspects such as firewalls and passwords (access control) or the diversification of 
soft- and hardware and are frequently discussed in the literature as they form the most 
fundamental layer of protection. They specify the level of system accessibility (Kunnathur, 
2015) and are designed to make aggression less attractive to attackers (Al Kattan et al., 
2009). However, many authors argue that such technical countermeasures only provide a 
partial solution and, therefore, need to be complemented by actions that are directed at the 
backbone of every supply chain, i.e., the personnel (e.g., Smith et al., 2007; Boyson, 2014; 
Boyes, 2015).  
The implementation of automated IT operations has allowed companies to employ 
fewer staff (Urciuoli et al., 2013). In addition, some argue that, the few remaining IT staff 
are then over challenged as employees and have little time for security awareness 
(Sindhuja, 2014; Venter, 2014; Kunnathur, 2015), holistic understanding of systems (Faisal 
et al., 2007; Urciuoli and Hintsa, 2017) and commitment (Tran et al., 2016; Boone, 2017). 
To nurture the capabilities of their employees and prepare them for the new challenges of 
cyber chains, risk awareness initiatives and training are among the most cited 
countermeasures in the literature (Table III). 
Table III. Measures for mitigating cyber risk
Pre-attack phase 
Access control
Warren and Hutchinson (2000); Deane et al.
(2009); Sindhuja and Kunnathur (2015)
Accreditation against security standards
Warren and Hutchinson (2000); Stephens and 
Valverde (2013); Bahl and Wali (2014); 
Keegan (2014) Venter (2014); Davis (2015); 
Sindhuja and Kunnathur (2015) 
Certified hard- and software
Boyson (2014); Kim and Im (2014); Sokolov 
et al. (2014); Windelberg (2016)
Cross-functional communication
Boyson (2014); Sindhuja and Kunnathur 
(2015)
Formal agreements between SC partners
Cai and Jun (2008); Boyson (2014); Sindhuja 
and Kunnathur (2015); Tran et al. (2016)
Information sharing
Barlow and Li (2007); Boyson (2014); Linton 
et al. (2014); Urciouli (2015)
Internalisation of operations Boone (2017)
More sophisticated and diverse 
applications
Jones and Horowitz (2012); Tran et al. (2016)
Network audit
Deane et al. (2009); Stephens and Valverde 
(2013); Davis (2015); Windelberg (2016) 
Risk awareness initiatives
Warren and Hutchinson (2000); Deane et al.
(2009); Stephens and Valverde (2013); 
Boyson (2014); Davis (2015); Sindhuja and 
Kunnathur (2015)
Risk classification
Faisal et al. (2007); Stephens and Valverde 
(2013); Boyson (2014); Davis (2015); 
Windelberg (2016)
Risk identification software
Zhang et al. (2012) Manzouri et al. (2013); 
Bartol (2014); Boyson (2014); Charitoudi and 
Blyth (2014)
Standard guidelines for SC 
collaboration
Pfleeger et al. (2007); Rongping and 
Yonggang (2014); Davis (2015); Sindhuja 
and Kunnathur (2015) 
Supplier audit
Zhang et al. (2012); Bartol (2014); 
Windelberg (2016) 
Training 
Warren and Hutchinson (2000); Pfleeger et al.
(2007); Deane et al. (2009); Deane et al.
(2010); Bartol (2014); Davis (2015); Sindhuja 
and Kunnathur (2015); Tran et al. (2016) 
Vulnerability checks
Jones and Horowitz (2012); Stephens and 
Valverde (2013); Boyes (2015)
“Zero-trust” policy Boone (2017)
Trans-attack phase 
Data consistency checks Jones and Horowitz (2012)
Task force Davis (2015)
Post-attack phase 
Forensics Jones and Horowitz (2012)
Incident documentation
Deane et al. (2009); Davis (2015); 
Windelberg (2016)
Insurances
Huang et al. (2008); Boyson (2014); Camillo 
(2017)
Recovery and backup procedures Deane et al. (2009); Windelberg (2016)
Equally prominent in the literature is the accreditation of cyber systems against 
security standards, such as ISO/IEC. Until now, official bodies have developed and 
introduced dozens of standards for different industries and sectors covering cyber security 
issues (Bartol, 2014). The adherence to these standards can serve as a base for a standard 
set of terminology and understanding of key security concepts (Davis, 2015), but also as a 
guideline to desired security objectives (Kunnathur, 2015). Nevertheless, from a SC 
perspective, the implementation of these standards has often been criticised for various 
reasons. Kunnathur (2015) argue that current standards are designed for independent 
companies; although there is a strong need for standardised inter-organisational practices, 
it lacks as evidenced by the variety of accrediting bodies/organisations (ibid). Keegan 
(2014) and Davis (2015) argue that due to the numbers of entities in most supply chains, 
successful implementation of inter-organisational standards is only replicable at the level 
of direct supply (Tier 1 suppliers), but cannot extend further up the supply chain network. 
Hence, the focal company spending resources on accreditation against these standards 
cannot ensure that the entire SC will follow their example. Venter (2014) is particularly 
critical of the standards, stating that some of the proposed methods are not feasible or are 
simply bad practice. Another criticism is that there is a common misconception of ISO 
standards, that they do not have an expiration date (Al-Najjar and Jawad, 2011). This makes 
companies believe that once they have acquired accreditation, they will always meet the 
required standards. Consequently, companies which have acquired a certificate often 
assume they do not have to improve their processes continuously, thus risking 
complacency.
Another countermeasure which is frequently examined in the literature but still 
requires thorough evaluation is information sharing. As stated in Table IV, many authors 
consider information sharing as a promising way to cope with cyber risks, because it allows 
for intra- and inter-organisational communication and processing of risk-relevant data. The 
enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018 is likely to 
standardise information sharing to protect breaches of individual and business rights and 
freedom (National Cyber Security Centre, UK, 2018). Paradoxically, many scholars claim 
that information sharing is one of the most severe threats to cyberspaces. This is due to the 
level of support required to handle large volumes of highly sensitive information, without 
which human errors increase (Smith et al., 2007; Deane et al., 2009; Kim and Im, 2014). 
Nevertheless, as Tran et al. (2016) found in a series of interviews, many companies do not 
perceive potential ‘information leakage' as a security risk. It is critical that employees 
frequently change their passwords and do not share passwords with others to avoid 
information leakage.  
 Most of the risks discussed in the literature can be attributed to the pre-attack 
phase; few articles address countermeasures for subsequent phases (trans-attack and post-
attack). To address this imbalance, more work is needed on the proactive mitigation of 
cyber risks and reactive mitigation strategies. ‘Cyber-insurance' is one prominent 
mitigating measure for the post-attack stage. Cyber insurance dates from projections for 
Y2K related crashes but has burgeoned due to the increase in virtual events and their impact 
on businesses (Camillo, 2017). The growth of Industry 4.0 is likely to be regulated by 
similar insurance policies. It may be impossible to design the perfect cyber security system 
that can deter all risks; therefore, it is expedient to have a diverse set of countermeasures 
at hand, covering different risk attack scenarios and contingencies.   
5 Conclusion 
At its core, supply chain management is a discipline of connectedness; integrating the 
activities and processes of diverse organisations into effectively functioning networks. But 
with supply chain integration comes dependencies, some purely commercial, but many 
arising from integrating IT systems to exchange data/information, giving rise to supply 
chain cyber risk. This study defines supply chain cyber risk as accidental or deliberate IT 
events that threaten the integrity of a supply chain’s infrastructure, leading to cascading 
disruptions. Similar to conventional supply chain risks, cyber risk impacts in terms of 
financial losses, delays and loss of customer service on a short-term basis; and market value 
and brand reputation on a long-term basis. 
A SLR on the nascent area of cyber risks in supply chains was conducted applying 
a rigorous, transparent and replicable methodology. The study addressed the research 
question: How can organisations manage cyber risks in supply chains? Text mining was 
followed by connectivity-based clustering to identify and verify the core themes (Figure 6) 
that guide and inform the analysis. Five meta themes were selected: cyber risk types; cyber 
risk propagation; cyber risk points of penetration; cyber security challenges and mitigation 
measures.  
Under cyber risks, the study classifies cyber risks into five categories: physical 
threats, breakdown, indirect attacks, direct attacks and insider threats. Cyber risk 
propagation zones were identified (primary, secondary and tertiary) drawing on previous 
work which suggests supply chain risks are not static and follows the ‘risk propagation’ 
phenomenon (Ghadge et al., 2013; Garvey et al., 2015). The third meta-theme identifies 
three key failure points where cyber risks are likeliest to emerge. The study classifies these 
‘points of penetration' (PoPs) into technical, human and physical dimensions. Four critical 
challenges for an organisation trying to manage supply chain cyber risks are recognised; 
inter-organisational collaboration; employee knowledge, continuous improvement and the 
need for government level involvement. The fifth and final meta-theme is measures for 
mitigation. Although carry over measures from traditional risk mitigation work are 
identified in the literature, the study rejects using a conventional proactive and reactive risk 
mitigation classification and instead adopts a time phase-based classification. See Table III 
for classification of cyber risk measures for mitigation following pre, trans and post cyber-
attack stages.  
While indirect and direct attacks (i.e., viruses, hacker attacks, spoofing attacks) are 
undoubtedly the most commonly discussed types of attack, the study found that the 
increasing integration and complexity of cyber SCs, facilitates the occurrence of 
unintentional cyber risk events such as the underperformance of a critical cyber system or 
an unintended human error. With the latter, the employee could potentially be anywhere in 
the interconnected SC, adding to unpredictability and compounding consequences. For 
capturing these consequences, this study used a risk propagation approach and depicted 
how cyber risks occurring at one point of penetration spread to other linked entities driven 
by SC inter-connectivity. 
5.1. Conceptual model
This study finds that companies need to implement identified control measures holistically 
at the SC level to create an extensive supply chain cyber security system that builds upon 
elements from both IT and organisational security systems. To address this need and 
building on the finding that cyber supply chain risks can emerge from different sources,  
the study proposes a ‘supply chain cyber security system’ as a unifying conceptual model 
(Figure 10). These sources are identified as either associated with IT (e.g., such as a direct 
or indirect attack), organisational (e.g., insider threat) or the supply chain (e.g., physical 
threat) systems. Thus, all three diverse elements namely, IT system, organisation process, 
and supply chain security system (which includes process and infrastructure network) must 
be aligned to manage cyber risk in supply chains. Each of these three can then be linked to 
specific PoPs weak points and linked with technical, human and physical levels. Thus, IT 
security systems can counter cyber threats by buying hardware, the latest technology and 
secure software platforms. Organisational security system mitigates cyber-attack by 
securing physical assets, adhering to set guidelines and by raising awareness among 
employees. Information sharing, collaborative risk management, and adaptability are found 
to be key strategies for supply chain security. This interlinked relationship between 
different (sub) system (shown in overlapping circles in Figure 10) and distinct mitigation 
strategies (shown in the triangles) is critical for managing cyber risk in supply chains. 
Coordination of these security systems, joint information sharing and applying appropriate 
mitigating strategies can effectively manage cyber risk in supply chains.  
Figure 10. A conceptual model for Supply Chain Cyber Security System 
Hardware 
system
Software system
Tecnology
Physical assets
Employee awareness
Rules and 
guidelines
Information 
sharing
Collaborative risk management
Agility and
Adaptability
This integrated model shown in Figure 10, is termed a Supply Chain Cyber Security 
System. The conceptual model shows that IT, organisation and supply chain security 
systems are interlinked, and closer collaboration is essential for successful implementation 
of cyber risk mitigation strategies (Stephens and Valverde, 2013; Hamlen and 
Thuraisingham, 2013; Urciuoli et al., 2013; Bartol, 2014). These inter-disciplinary security 
systems should be coordinated to standardise and implement agreed cyber security 
strategies for supply chains and wider networks. Alignment of responsibilities and 
managing conflicting policies/regulations in each system is a challenging problem to 
handle. There is however the age-old threat that a chain is only as strong as its weakest 
link; hence our model’s focus on the integration of IT system, organisation and supply 
chain (including process and network infrastructure) security system.  
5.2 A research agenda for managing cyber risk in supply chains 
A literature review is expected to provide critical knowledge gaps along with the 
development of new models, proposition or theories (Webster and Watson, 2002). The 
main avenues for future research that emerged from this review are now presented. Recent 
research has suggested several dimensions that have a substantial influence on a SC's 
vulnerability to cyber risk. These include different network configurations 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2012), firm sizes (Tran et al., 2016), corporate 
cultures (Xue et al., 2013), industry sectors (Sharma and Routroy, 2016; Tran et al., 2016) 
and business principles (Durowoju et al., 2012; Charitoudi and Blyth, 2014). This research 
found that most studies take a generic perspective, and therefore, this study pinpoints the 
need for contextualised studies that address such dimensions in-depth to relate specific 
cyber risks to specific dimensions. Similarly, an array of mitigation measures against cyber 
risks have been identified; however, there is little evidence of specific measures for 
mitigation being empirically tested. So, to make the mitigation decision useful, for clarity 
of when and where responses work best, strategies are identified and separated into the 
three phases namely, pre-, trans- and post-attack. Adopting this approach reveals that there 
is a lack of research on developing tailored measures for cyber security threats. In addition 
to highly context-specific studies, large-scale data-driven research is necessary, which can 
then be utilised to test hypotheses and models (Barlow and Li, 2007; Kunnathur, 2015). 
Empirical research on building robust cyber security models utilising modern big data 
analytics tools and techniques is also required to inform and fuel the next generation of 
research in this field.
It is evident from this SLR that human/behavioural factors play a vital role in cyber 
security, and yet have been neglected in favour of studying more technical factors such as 
data, applications and networks. In cyberspace, employees are a major failure point (PoPs), 
yet technologically empowered employees manage developments such as IoT, blockchain 
and decentralised distribution (omnichannel retailing) with little awareness or training on 
data security. Incriminating human interactions have widely been ignored (Kunnathur, 
2015). A variety of supply chain stakeholders can sabotage, either deliberately or 
unwillingly, even the most sophisticated security systems. However, this study also detects 
a related lack of research on the impact of cyber risk on employees (and by definition 
therefore their employing organisation). This is very much an under-explored area 
(Manzouri et al., 2013), which will become of increasing interest to employees, employers 
and society. 
5.3 Implications for research and practice 
To identify relevant literature of an appropriate quality and quantity, the SLR had to extend 
beyond articles in the operations, logistics and supply chain area. Following a replicable 
and reiterative screening and synthesis process, the scope of this study was still limited to 
41 independently verified interdisciplinary papers published between 1990 and 2017. 
Complementary cluster analysis following data mining approach provided support for 
transparency and rigour in conducting what is believed to be a first SLR on cyber risk in 
supply chains.  
The paper provides the following implications for research and practice. The 
negative consequences of cyber security disruptions could impact not only individual firms 
or SCs, but entire globally-connected communities. The limited set of papers available for 
this study suggests that little academic attention has addressed this field compared to other 
topics/technologies interfacing with supply chain management such as the Internet of 
Things (IoT), Blockchain, digitalisation, autonomous transportation and virtual reality. 
Interestingly, all these disruptive technologies are vulnerable to cyber risks due to the rapid 
transformation of supply chains following the Industry 4.0 revolution. Supply chain 
integration and digitalisation go hand in hand. Recently Gartner (2018) predicted that there 
would be 14.2 billion devices connected worldwide by 2019. Consequently, it is vital to 
raise awareness of cyber security risks in supply chains and help both practitioners and 
academics manage future disruptive cyber risks. 
There is an increased misuse of cyber-physical systems for counterfeits, forgeries, 
data theft, trafficking, attacks on transportation infrastructure, ransomware attacks and 
Crypto-jacking. Such cyber activities significantly impact multiple stakeholders with clear 
implications for a broader ecosystem. How will businesses, governments and society react 
to profound and frequent cyber-attacks? This is perhaps the most fundamental cyber risk-
related line of questioning, as the answers will dictate the speed and level of investment in 
cyber security worldwide. 
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Supply chain attacks Cyber breaches Firewall 
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Supply chain integrity Cyber crisis Infrastructure 
Supply chain integrity risk Cyber disruptions Phishing 
Supply chain resilience Cyber/IT failure Sabotage 
Supply chain risk(s)  Cyber incident Security 
Supply chain security Cyber resilience Spoofing  
Supply chain threats Cyber supply chain(s) Surveillance 
Risk identification Cyber supply chain risk management Terrorism 
Risk assessment Cyber systems Threat 
Risk mitigation Cyber supply network 
Risk control Data/Information security 
Information infrastructure 
Information security/risk 
